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ABSTRACT 
Omar Khadr stands for the melancholy proposition that Canadian courts will 
recognize a rights violation without demanding an effective remedy. Over the 
years, Khadr secured many legal remedies, but not the one he sought most: a 
repatriation order. Why? This paper ventures explanations by viewing the  
final five Khadr judgments through the lenses of corrective and equitable  
justice. The final section of the paper recasts the case for the repatriation of 
Omar Khadr based on two principal arguments. First, a context of structural 
injustice suggests the application of equitable remedial principles rather than 
corrective justice, even in the transnational context in which Canada cannot 
impose structural remedies. Second, the Khadr case suggests that declaratory 
relief is not an appropriate remedy when delay may cause irreparable harm 
and where the government may be credibly suspected of bad faith. 
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Omar Khadr, onetime Canadian child combatant turned constitutional metaphor, 
stands for the melancholy proposition that Canadian courts will recognize a rights viola-
tion without demanding an effective remedy. Over the years, Khadr secured many legal 
remedies—an injunction against further interrogations in 2005, fuller disclosure of 
evidence in 2008, a declaration of the ongoing violation of his section 7 rights in 2010—
but not the remedy he sought most: a repatriation order. Why? This paper ventures 
explanations by viewing Khadr’s proceedings through the lenses of corrective and equi-
table justice. After brief treatments of corrective and equitable justice in remedial theory, 
supplemented by Paul Gewirtz’s conception of a “Rights Maximizing” equitable judge, I 
proceed with preliminary commentary on a quintet of Khadr judgments: the Canada v 
Khadr (Khadr II) trilogy in the Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme 
Court, as well as the subsequent Zinn J. judgment in Federal Court and the Blais J. 
response in the Federal Court of Appeal. The decisions of Federal Court judges O’Reilly 
and Zinn embody a robust practice of equitable “Rights Maximizing,” but higher courts 
did not share their enthusiasm for a judicial repatriation order.  
The final section of this paper recasts the case for the repatriation of Omar Khadr. 
Two principal arguments emerge. First, equitable remedial principles are more appropri-
ate than corrective justice in a context of structural injustice, even in the transnational 
setting in which Canada cannot impose structural remedies. Second, the Khadr case 
suggests that declaratory relief is not appropriate when delay may cause irreparable harm 
or where the government may be credibly suspected of bad faith.  
FACTS 
Fifteen-year-old Omar Khadr was wounded and captured in a battle with American 
soldiers in Afghanistan in 2002. An American soldier shot him nearly dead, and then an 
American medic saved his life.1 Later, Americans interrogated him, first in Bagram 
prison in Afghanistan and later at Guantanamo prison in Cuba. Canada was initially 
denied consular access, but in 2003 and 2004 two Canadian officials from CSIS and 
Foreign Affairs interrogated Khadr. This was done without offering legal counsel, while 
he was being subjected to a questionable detention regime. Khadr claimed he was tor-
tured and pleaded: “Promise you’ll protect me from Americans.”2 The information 
from the Canadian interrogations was shared with his American captors.  
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
Corrective justice insists on symmetry between a wrong and its remedy. For an in-
dividual subjected to a wrongful transfer, Aristotle said corrective justice would consist 
                                                                                                                                            
1 After the firefight, some of the American soldiers had to be restrained while the medic tended to Khadr. 
One soldier said: “It’s worse for him to live.” See Michelle Shephard, Guantanamo’s Child: The Untold Story of 
Omar Khadr (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons Canada, 2008). 
2 Ibid at 124. 
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“in having an equal amount before and after the transaction.”3 As in private law, where 
a tortfeasor or breaching party of a contract can be asked to restore the plaintiff to a 
pre-tort or pre-breach status quo, corrective justice in the constitutional context is guid-
ed by a “make-whole aspiration.”4 Corrective justice looks to a pre-wrong past for 
remedial guidance: “Full correction means restoration of a notional status quo ante, by 
which the victims of illegal conduct are returned to the position they occupied before 
the wrong, and those responsible for the wrong are made to bear the burden of the 
restoration.”5 As a remedial approach, corrective justice offers two advantages: “deter-
minacy and unambiguous moral force.”6 It measures the harm caused by a wrong and 
matches it with an equivalent remedy—no more and no less.   
In “The Limits of Corrective Justice and the Potential of Equity in Constitutional 
Remedies,” Kent Roach explores the merits of corrective justice in constitutional set-
tings. In rectifying past wrongs, corrective justice seeks to prescribe retrospective 
remedies. It looks to right past wrongs, not address present needs.7 It is concerned with 
the present only insofar as it is tainted by a past wrong. Corrective justice also prefers 
temporary remedial intervention.8 The prolonged and forward-looking jurisdictional 
oversight of a case like Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), in which a 
court committed to overseeing future educational reforms, is anathema to the corrective 
tradition. Finally, corrective justice disregards the interests of the wrongdoer asked to 
bear the remedial burden.9 His perspective is—at least according to the tenets of correc-
tive justice—irrelevant; it is not an appropriate limit to the scope of a remedy, which is 
measured solely by the scope of the harm. There is no legitimate discretion to deny 
corrective justice if a determinate harm and its remedy can be identified.  
Corrective justice, Roach notes, has a disadvantage in constitutional cases: its strict 
causation requirements can imperil an appropriate remedy.10 Absent an ironclad and 
identifiable causal chain flowing from a given wrong to its eventual harm, corrective 
justice will not sanction an adequate remedy. Khadr’s situation raises a number of causa-
tion issues. If the wrong was an unlawful interrogation by Canadian agents, what exactly 
did this cause? Khadr was already in detention before a visit by Canadian officials and 
the sharing of extracted “Canadian evidence” with American officials. Absent the addi-
tional material from the Canadian interrogations, the United States (US) may have kept 
him in detention anyway. The US had already gleaned evidence from the scene of 
Khadr’s capture, including images of Khadr allegedly assembling bombs.11 In addition 
to the uncertain role the Canadian evidence played in his continued detention, it is also 
unclear what weight the Canadian evidence was given in the subsequent military pro-
ceedings against him. It is not clear what causal threshold corrective justice demands. In 
addition, the intervening actions of a third party, the US, complicate the causal story 
                                                                                                                                            
3 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, rev ed by JL Acrill & JD Umson, translated by D Ross (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1925) at 117. 
4 Kent Roach, “The Limits of Corrective Justice and the Potential of Equity in Constitutional Remedies” 
(1991) 33 Ariz L Rev 859 at 867 [Roach, “Limits”]. 
5 Ibid at 859.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Roach, “Limits”, supra note 4 at 860. 
8 Ibid at 868. 
9 Ibid at 881. 
10 Ibid at 875. 
11 “Omar Khadr: The Youngest Terrorist?”, 60 Minutes (16 November 2007), online: CBS News 
<http://www.cbsnews.com>. 
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between Canada’s violation and the harm of detention. Corrective justice is bipolar, but 
Khadr’s interrogation by Canadian officials involved at least 3 parties—the US, Canada, 
and Khadr.  
EQUITABLE JUSTICE 
Equitable justice is characterized by the wide remedial discretion it grants to trial 
judges. It distinguishes itself from corrective justice with its increased flexibility on 
causation and restoration standards, as well as its capacity to look beyond the wrongdo-
er-victim paradigm. Here, the scope of an equitable remedy is not dictated by the scope 
of harm. A concern with equity may lead to a looser causal standard, or a disregard for 
causation altogether. As Roach notes, equity “allows courts to order remedies for harms 
that the state may not have caused,” as when the complex phenomenon of segregation 
cannot be blamed on given public actors.12 At this point, the dualistic relationship be-
tween the wrongdoer and the wronged breaks down. “Enriched” equitable remedies 
may extend beyond what corrective justice requires.13 This can be justified by shifting 
the remedial focus from past wrong to present needs.  
Charter remedial jurisprudence seems to draw more on the tradition of equitable 
justice than its corrective counterpart. Section 24(1) of the Charter empowers judges to 
grant “such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances” to 
“[a]nyone whose rights or freedoms…have been infringed or denied.”14 The majority in 
Doucet-Boudreau noted that it is “difficult to imagine language which could give the court 
a wider and less fettered discretion.”15 This includes the discretion not to grant a remedy. 
It is common to speak of a right to a corrective remedy, but no such equivalent right is 
recognized in equity. This can partly be explained by equity’s mandate to weigh the 
interests of the wrongdoer as it fashions an appropriate remedy. In the context of segre-
gation cases, an equitable approach to remedies was responsible for much inaction, 
delay, and inadequate vindication of victims’ rights in confronting entrenched racial 
injustice.16 This is the same kind of approach that guides courts in delaying declarations 
of invalidity under section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 198217 with rights violations 
continuing in the interim. Judges can thus use equity to “blunt remedial claims.”18  
Beyond concerns about non-victim interests, equity may also concern itself with en-
forceability of a remedy. Hence the maxim that “equity will not act in vain.”19 
Not all equitable judges share such prudence about enforcement. In “Remedies and 
Resistance,” Gewirtz describes two kinds of equitable judges. The first kind are “Inter-
est Balancing,” since they consider the social interests beyond the victim in selecting an 
                                                                                                                                            
12 Roach, “Limits”, supra note 4 at 887. 
13 Ibid at 880. 
14 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982 (UK), c 11. 
15 Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62 at para 50, [2003] 3 SCR 3 [Doucet-Boudreau]. 
16 Roach, “Limits”, supra note 4 at 887. 
17 Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 14, s 52(1). 
18 Roach, “Limits”, supra note 4 at 895.  
19 Normann Witzleb, “Equity Does Not Act in Vain: An Analysis of Futility Arguments in Claims for Injunc-
tions” (2010) 32 Sydney LR 503. 
 CORRECTIVE AND EQUITABLE JUSTICE FOR OMAR KHADR Vol. 23 
!
176 
appropriate remedy. For the “Rights Maximizer,” on the other hand, “the only question 
a court asks once it finds a violation is which remedy will be the most effective for the 
victims.”20 This type of judge only recognizes “unavoidable limits;” imperfect remedies 
are only acceptable if better alternatives are impossible. In the absence of insurmounta-
ble barriers, a Rights Maximizing judge is “committed to full remedial effectiveness at 
whatever cost.”21 And if one remedy proves ineffective, such a judge would order a 
potentially effective alternative: “indeed, a Rights Maximizing judge would be required 
to do so unless no further remedial effectiveness were possible.”22 On this view, the 
only way to meaningfully vindicate a right is to provide the most effective remedy, even 
in cases where enforcement is uncertain.  
THE KHADR QUINTET 
1. Khadr 2009 FC 405 
Khadr’s quest for repatriation began with O’Reilly J.’s favourable judgment in Fed-
eral Court. His repatriation order was upheld on appeal, set aside by the Supreme Court, 
then resurrected in Federal Court by Zinn J., and finally stayed by the Federal Court of 
Appeal. O’Reilly J. adopts an equitable approach without explicitly invoking equity. His 
recognition of expansive harm underlies his expansive remedy. Much of his reasoning 
was later narrowed or rejected in subsequent decisions of higher courts.  
O’Reilly J. recognizes existing international jurisprudence on diplomatic representa-
tions in England, Australia, and South Africa and the trend that states are not always 
required to take all steps to protect their citizens abroad. However, he concludes, per 
Kaunda and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa, that judges are obliged to accord 
“particular weight” to executive discretion without surrendering the power of judicial 
review altogether.23 Following the holding of Operation Dismantle v The Queen, O’Reilly J. 
does not recognize any Canadian doctrine that would shield the executive from consti-
tutional scrutiny, even in the field of foreign affairs.24 Ultimately, he finds that the 
requisite deference to executive discretion does not prohibit his remedial demand for 
repatriation. 
O’Reilly J. finds that Canada’s “knowing involvement” in the Guantanamo opera-
tion constituted a violation of Khadr’s section 7 Charter right.25 At Guantanamo Bay, 
Khadr was denied his habeas corpus right to challenge the legality of his detention, his 
status as a minor was ignored, and he was subjected to a detention regime that violated 
Canada’s obligations under the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.26 O’Reilly J. supplements his identification 
                                                                                                                                            
20 Paul Gewirtz, “Remedies and Resistance” (1983) 92:4 Yale LJ 585 at 591. 
21 Ibid at 596. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Kaunda and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa, [2004] ZACC 5 (S Afr Const Ct). 
24 Operation Dismantle v The Queen, [1985] 1 SCR 441, 18 DLR (4th) 481 (SCC). 
25 Khadr v Canada (Prime Minister), 2009 FC 405 at para 52, [2010] 1 FCR 34 at para 52 [Khadr FC]. 
26 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 
UNTS 85, arts 15, 19, 37, 39, 40, Can TS 1987 No 36 (entered into force 26 June 1987); Khadr FC, supra note 
25 at para 34. 
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of the rights violation with a consideration of Khadr’s vulnerability. He notes Khadr’s 
youth, precarious health, limited education, sparse access to consular assistance and legal 
counsel, “inability to challenge his detention or conditions of confinement in a court of 
law…and his presence in an unfamiliar, remote and isolated prison, with no family 
contact.”27 The discussion of vulnerability serves to enlarge the characterization of 
harm. Drawing on Canada’s international obligations under three international treaties, 
O’Reilly conjures a new narrow principle of fundamental justice: “a duty to protect 
persons in Mr. Khadr’s circumstances.”28  
We arrive at the central puzzle of the judgment: why did O’Reilly J. believe repatria-
tion was the only appropriate remedy? In addressing the appropriate remedy, he 
concludes: “no other remedy would appear to be capable of mitigating the effect of the 
Charter violations in issue or accord with the Government’s duty to promote Mr. 
Khadr’s physical, psychological and social rehabilitation and reintegration.”29 This sen-
tence’s first half draws a conclusion about the shortcomings of unnamed alternatives. 
The second half implies that Canada cannot repair its wrong without getting Khadr out 
of Guantanamo and actively rehabilitating him. The harm to be undone is Khadr’s 
detention and its effects, not simply Canada’s contribution to his detention. O’Reilly’s 
remedial purpose is to protect Khadr from possible torture, illegal detention, and the 
trauma of detention as a child—all the harms Khadr endured, not simply the harm 
Canada caused.  
Corrective justice would condemn repatriation as excessive remedial compensation 
unless Khadr’s detention and its connected harms could be causally connected to the 
Canadian evidence. Rather, O’Reilly J. displays three telltale signs of an equitable dispo-
sition. First, he implicitly holds Canada responsible to remedy violations it did not 
commit. For example, the US held Khadr despite his youth. Canada’s diplomatic corre-
spondence expressed concerns related to Khadr’s age and conditions of detention, but 
O’Reilly J. finds these measures inadequate because they were insufficiently effective in 
delivering protection. Second, he considers the impact of the remedy on the wrongdo-
er—that is, any harm that may flow to Canada from a repatriation order. Given that the 
government submitted no evidence of any “particular harm” that would flow from 
repatriation, he assigns no weight to this concern.30 Finally, he evinces a clear intention 
to fashion a forward-looking remedy, specifically a desire to rehabilitate Khadr from his 
experience as a child combatant and the trauma of his detention. This extends beyond 
restoring Khadr to his position prior to Canadian involvement.  
O’Reilly J. raises three further issues that recur in future judgments. First, he 
acknowledges the government’s concern that Khadr would not face prosecution in 
Canada, but he merely views this possibility as further proof that Khadr’s detention is 
illegitimate. Second, O’Reilly J. is undeterred by the possibility of the US rejecting a 
diplomatic request for repatriation, concluding that American assent was “likely.”31 
Finally, he notes that the repatriation remedy constitutes an intrusion on executive 
prerogative power, but deems it “minimally intrusive.”32 
                                                                                                                                            
27 Khadr FC, supra note 25 at para 70. 
28 Ibid at para 71.  
29 Ibid at para 78. 
30 Ibid at para 84. 
31 Ibid at para 88. 
32 Ibid at para 89. 
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2. Khadr 2010 FCA 246 
While the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal upheld O’Reilly J.’s remedy, 
Nadon J.A.’s dissent draws on principles of corrective justice to criticize the repatriation 
order. Two of the majority’s arguments merit review. First, the majority argues that the 
repatriation order does not constitute a “serious intrusion” on the Crown prerogative 
over foreign affairs because there was no evidence that the remedy would cause harm to  
Canadian–American relations. The argument hinges on O’Reilly J.’s interpretation of 
United States v Burns,33 which seemed to condone judicial intrusions on executive prerog-
ative in cases where evidence of harm to “good relations” with other states was 
lacking.34 At trial in the Khadr case, Crown counsel conceded in oral argument that the 
Crown “was not alleging that requiring Canada to make such a request would damage its 
relations with the US.”35 Indeed, the majority cites testimony suggesting the US even 
preferred the return of Khadr to Canada because a repatriation request could bode well 
for the bilateral relationship. The Supreme Court would later avoid this kind of inquiry. 
The majority also explores the relevance of predictions about American compliance 
with Canadian remedial requests. At trial, the Crown assessed the probability of Ameri-
cans releasing Khadr at “one chance in a million.”36 O’Reilly J. previously called 
American assent “likely.”37 Here, the majority notes past American compliance with 
repatriation requests of other western countries and finds no evidence to support the 
Crown’s gloomy assessment. In the following paragraph, the majority acknowledges that 
the factual record does not provide a “basis for predicting with certainty” the potential 
American response, but they deem such conjecture to be irrelevant.38 The remedy 
should be guided by principle, not probability of success: “the fact that Canada has no 
control over the response of the US does not mean that it is inappropriate to order the 
request to be made.”39 This approach is echoed in the British judgment Rahmatullah v 
Secretary of State40 (as explained further below), but it would elicit no sympathy from the 
Canadian Supreme Court.  
Nadon J.A.’s dissent, by contrast, displays undertones of corrective justice. By in-
voking the need for proportionality between remedy and harm—he calls repatriation 
“totally disproportionate”—he aligns himself with the corrective tradition.41 However, 
Nadon J.A.’s application of corrective principles is curious. He suggests that an order 
prohibiting use of the evidence gathered in the 2003-2004 interrogations could be an 
adequate remedy for any future Canadian prosecution of Khadr. This remedy, he says, 
“would have at least some connection to the alleged breach.”42 However, Nadon J.A. 
ignores the connection between the Canadian rights breach and the potential use of the 
evidence in American legal proceedings. Nadon J.A. concludes that the 2005 remedial 
order by the Supreme Court to terminate further Canadian interrogation of Khadr ef-
fectively remedied the breach. “That breach, in my respectful view,” Nadon J.A. says of 
                                                                                                                                            
33 United States v Burns, 2001 SCC 7, [2001] 1 SCR 283 [Burns]. 
34 Khadr FC, supra note 25 at para 84. 
35 Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2009 FCA 246 at para 59, [2010] 1 FCR 73 [Khadr FCA 2009]. 
36 Ibid at para 69. 
37 Khadr FC, supra note 25 at para 84. 
38 Khadr FCA 2009, supra note 35 at para 70. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Rahmatullah, supra note †. 
41 Ibid at para 114. 
42 Ibid. 
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the 2003–2004 Charter-violating interrogations, “has been remedied” by the 2005 or-
der.43 The order did indeed prevent any further direct violation of Khadr’s rights by 
Canadian officials. However, Nadon J.A. ignores the role played by the sharing of the 
intelligence with American officials on Khadr’s continued detention. The Supreme 
Court would later dismiss such reasoning, but it nevertheless demonstrates a skepticism 
of the causal connection between the wrongful Canadian interrogations and the harm of 
Khadr’s detention. Nadon J.A.’s effort to restrict the remedy by applying strict causal 
analysis is informed by a corrective approach. However, Nadon resiles himself from the 
transnational implications of Canada’s wrong. 
Finally, Nadon J.A.’s judgment is noteworthy because he invokes the institutional 
concerns that would guide the outcome of the subsequent Supreme Court judgment. 
He could not accept the intrusion on executive prerogative required by a judicial repat-
riation order.  
3. Khadr 2010 SCC 3 
The 2010 Supreme Court judgment torpedoes O’Reilly J.’s repatriation remedy 
with its concerns about the judiciary overstepping its institutional role. The Supreme 
Court substitutes a remedy of declaratory relief recognizing the infringements on 
Khadr’s Charter rights, but defers to the discretion of the executive in shaping a further 
response. The unanimous Court invokes the remedial principles articulated in Doucet-
Boudreau to buttress its prudent approach. Though the majority in Doucet-Boudreau noted 
that section 24(1) gave wide and virtually unfettered discretion to design a remedy that 
“meaningfully vindicates” rights, it also noted that courts must only fashion remedies 
that are appropriate to the “framework of a constitutional democracy” and that do not 
exceed the “function and powers of the court.”44  
From the standpoint of corrective justice, the judgment is significant because it 
brushes aside Nadon’s skepticism concerning causation and settles enough of the causal 
story to tie Canada’s rights violations to Khadr’s ongoing detention. The Court con-
cludes “that the causal connection…between Canadian conduct and the deprivation of 
liberty and security of person is established,” given the contribution of “significant” 
Canadian evidence to Khadr’s “continued detention.”45 The wrongful interrogation 
caused the continuing harm of detention, at least from a legal perspective of the facts. 
The Court also determined that the “significant” Canadian evidence was “potentially 
admissible” in US proceedings.46 Roach calls the Supreme Court’s causal findings “gen-
erous” for Khadr.47 Presumably, the Court could have invoked a higher standard of 
causation to save themselves the trouble of finding a section 7 violation for which they 
had to find a respectable remedy.  
Corrective justice seems to demand a clear remedy for Omar Khadr: exclusion of 
the Canadian evidence in legal proceedings against Khadr. Suppose that Canada per-
suaded the Americans to exclude the evidence garnered by Canadian officials in the 
                                                                                                                                            
43 Ibid at para 101. 
44 Doucet-Boudreau, supra note 15 at paras 56-57. 
45 Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3 at paras 20-21, [2010] 1 SCR 44 [Khadr SCC]. 
46 Ibid at para 20. 
47 Kent Roach, “The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics: The Afghan Detainee and Omar Khadr Cases” 
(2010) 28 NJCL 115 at 20 [Roach, “Supreme Court”]. 
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2003 and 2004 interrogations. Canada’s wrongful act would be expunged, along with its 
causal harm. As Roach notes, “[e]xclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence…can 
nullify the wrongdoing and ensure that the victim [does] not suffer further harms from 
the violation.”48 Insofar as the Canadian evidence contributed to Khadr’s detention or 
might contribute to a military tribunal verdict, its effect would thereby be nullified. Of 
course, it is possible that Khadr would still find himself in detention (the same position 
he was in before Canadian involvement) after he is restored from Canadian harm, but 
this would not be on account of any Canadian wrongdoing, at least theoretically.  
The Court’s crucial phrase in the judgment’s second last paragraph—“at this 
point”—deserves special attention. The Court settles for prudence and declaratory relief 
“at this point.”49 Those three words suggest the Court is only temporarily paying defer-
ence, not promising abstinence. The Court acknowledges its power to order a more 
robust remedy should the need arise. Despite its discussion about relative institutional 
competence and separation of powers, the Court does not surrender the field altogether. 
It anticipates the potential for further litigation in the absence of an acceptable remedial 
response by the executive. The alternative would have been for the court to retain  
supervisory jurisdiction to oversee the sufficiency of the executive’s response. Rather, 
the Supreme Court settled for declaratory relief. In Little Sisters v Canada, Iacobucci J.’s 
dissent notes that declaratory relief has the disadvantage of requiring future litigation to 
be enforced.50 Here, the Supreme Court sets the framework for an adequate remedy, 
reserving the right to further review the executive’s response within its “narrow power” 
to do so.51 
Arguably, the Supreme Court’s prudence is guided by an equitable concern for  
remedial enforceability. However, it eschews the Rights Maximizing approach Gewirtz 
describes. The Supreme Court seems to draw on the more prudent strain of equity, 
refusing to demand a transnational remedy that could not necessarily be enforced. Equi-
table justice offers a range of answers for Omar Khadr, and the Supreme Court’s 
deference to the executive was one among them. 
Yet the judgment is ambiguous about what would constitute an adequate remedy. 
The judgment does not articulate a minimum remedy or a remedial goal with sufficient 
precision to guide an assessment of the government’s response. It does not invoke a 
phrase like “best efforts” to commit the government to exhausting all possible options, 
should initial remedial efforts prove fruitless. It does not retain jurisdiction over the 
matter, which the Court could have done in order to update the evidentiary record and 
oversee the adequacy of the government’s discretionary response. This ambiguity has 
consequences. 
The Government Remedy 
Sixteen days after the Supreme Court’s decision, the Harper government sent the 
US a diplomatic note requesting that the Canadian evidence be excluded. The decisive 
sentence in this note reads as follows:  
                                                                                                                                            
48 Roach, “Limits”, supra note 4 at 870. 
49 Khadr SCC, supra note 45 at para 47. 
50 Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada, 2000 SCC 69, [2000] 2 SCR 1120. 
51 Ibid at para 38.  
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The Government of Canada therefore respectfully requests assurances that 
any evidence or statements share [sic] with US authorities as a result of the 
interviews with Mr. Khadr by Canadian agents and officials not be used 
against him by US authorities in the context of proceedings before the Mili-
tary Commission or elsewhere.52 
Besides the regrettable spelling error in the sentence most crucial to Khadr’s fate, we see 
a government remedy befitting the demands of corrective justice. On this view, the 
exclusion of the Canadian evidence would undo Canada’s wrong. However, the request 
was ignored by the US, which proceeded to use the evidence against Khadr.53 
4. Khadr 2010 FC 715 
Zinn J.’s decision of the Federal Court resurrects the repatriation order. His judg-
ment focuses on effectiveness, not enforceability. He reviews the government’s remedial 
decision, finding that Khadr had been denied procedural fairness.  
In keeping with Gewirtz’s “Rights Maximizing” equitable approach, Zinn J.’s 
judgment is guided by the imperative for an effective remedy to respond to Khadr’s 
present needs—namely, a return to Canada.54 He notes that the Charter obliges Canada 
to “cure” Khadr’s detention.55 On a corrective justice view, as I indicated earlier, this 
conclusion does not necessarily follow. Even if the US had accepted the conditions of 
Canada’s diplomatic note and kept Khadr in detention, Zinn J. would have maintained 
the same position: Canada must exhaust “all reasonably practical steps” to secure his 
return.56 As it happened, since the proffered remedy proved inadequate, “the best poss-
ible remedy” was required.57 In a case with multiple possible remedies of uncertain 
effectiveness, Zinn J. requires all options to be exhausted until a breach is remedied.  
Zinn J. acknowledges the transnational context for the remedial enterprise, includ-
ing the American veto over any proposed Canadian remedy: “Canada can propose, but 
the US must consent.”58 Zinn J. similarly recognizes that the repatriation order intrudes 
on the royal prerogative, but gives this consideration little weight in a situation where 
there is only “one remedy available.”59 Zinn J., having watched the failure of the gov-
ernment’s diplomatic note, concludes that the “court is required to order that it be 
done.”60 
5. Khadr 2010 FCA 199 
Ironically, Blais J. of the Federal Court of Appeal draws on the equitable doctrine 
of a stay of proceedings to stymie Zinn J.’s effort to fashion a maximally equitable rem-
edy. He returns to the Supreme Court’s concern about the appropriate division of 
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powers, calling Zinn J.’s order a usurpation of legitimate executive prerogative. It is 
instructive to contrast Blais J. and O’Reilly J.’s use of the concept of harm. Whereas 
O’Reilly J. could adduce no evidence of any “particular harm” to the Crown by the 
repatriation order, Blais J. concludes that such a judicial move would cause “unequivo-
cal” harm to the Crown’s discretionary power.61 One judge sees no harm, while the 
other sees unequivocal harm. Perhaps the judges have different types of harm in mind. 
O’Reilly’s conception of harm admits evidence; a judicial intrusion either causes harm or 
it does not. Blais J. has conceptual institutional harm in mind; to him, a categorical 
intrusion necessarily harms gravely.  
Blais J.’s judgment is particularly obtuse when he says: “[I]t is too hard at this point 
in time to even determine how the Canadian evidence might be used (if at all) in the US 
trial and if remedies could potentially be available later on in the process.”62 The first 
half of this sentence is badly misleading in two respects. First, by the time this judgment 
was written, the Canadian evidence had already been used in Khadr’s trial by military 
tribunal (as Blais J. acknowledges in the next paragraph). Second, it is reasonable to 
presume the Canadian evidence would be used to establish Khadr’s guilt. If the Canad-
ian evidence was exculpatory, it is unlikely that there would have been such a fuss over 
its exclusion. With regards to the second half of the sentence (“remedies could poten-
tially be available later on in the process”), it is not at all clear what Blais J. is suggesting. 
The possibility of an effective remedy for Khadr was decreasing with time as his Ameri-
can trial progressed. The “later” in the process, the less relevant Canadian remedies 
would become, with the exception of damages. If Blais J. is referring to American rem-
edies, then he misjudged the nature and practice of American remedies in the national 
security and Guantanamo context. As Roach notes in “Substitute Justice,” “the record 
of American courts in providing actual remedies for national security abuses is weak.”63  
The American executive is largely insulated from judicial review by a sophisticated 
and nearly comprehensive system of extra-legalism. Roach defines “extra-legalism” as “a 
process where legalistic and positivistic claims of legal authority are used to prevent 
courts from reviewing state actions on their merits.”64 A host of American legal doc-
trines65 have insulated the United States from claims about extraordinary rendition, 
indeterminate detention without trial, targeted killing, and torture. For example, Khalid 
El-Masri tried and failed to sue CIA officials who assisted in his extraordinary rendition 
from Macedonia to Afghanistan, where he was allegedly tortured.66 He was eventually 
released on the grounds that his capture was a mistake. He later noted: “it seems the 
only place in the world where my case cannot be discussed is in a U.S. courtroom.”67  
El-Masri’s case exemplifies a trend whereby those harmed by American counter-
terrorist efforts have been denied judicial review in American courts.  
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Blais J.’s focus on the uses of the Canadian evidence suggests a narrow corrective 
view of justice. By raising causation issues with respect to the evidence’s continuing 
importance, he limits the Canadian connection to Khadr’s evolving predicament.  
Finally, Blais J. acknowledges that the staying of the repatriation order would result 
in Khadr’s military trial commencing and perhaps ending without any further Canadian 
remedy.68 But he cites the “rapidly evolving” situation as further reason to respect the 
executive’s discretion to do as it saw fit.69 In my view, it is precisely when time is of the 
essence that judicial deference is least appropriate.  
THE CASE FOR REPATRIATION 
Omar Khadr pled guilty to murder before an American military tribunal in August 
2010, an outcome of questionable legitimacy70 given the nature of the proceedings, and 
was transferred in September 2012 to Canada to serve the remainder of his sentence. 
Canada now dutifully respects and enforces a sentence obtained with the help of uncon-
stitutionally obtained evidence. This outcome is unacceptable. Canada did not take 
sufficient steps to meaningfully vindicate Khadr’s rights. What follows is the strongest 
case that could have been made for a repatriation order in 2010.  
There are two principal arguments. First, the context of structural injustice suggests 
the application of equitable remedial principles rather than corrective justice. Second, 
Khadr’s case demonstrates that declaratory relief is not an appropriate remedy when 
delay may cause irreparable harm and where the government may be credibly suspected 
of bad faith.  
The case for repatriation begins with the argument that corrective justice and its 
proposed remedy to exclude the Canadian evidence is not appropriate to a context of 
structural injustice. In “The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics,” Roach asks whether 
American agreement to exclude the Canadian evidence would have sufficed as a remedy 
for Khadr. I think not, even though it would have “broken the causal” link between the 
Canadian wrong and Khadr’s detention.71 Canadian courts can attempt to correct the 
determinate harms by a Canadian actor, but this overlooks additional harms being 
committed by third parties outside the bilateral litigation. In Khadr’s case, a single third 
party looms: the US government, which supervised detention at Guantanamo. 
The argument for equitable justice for Khadr rests partly on the “inappropriateness 
of corrective theory in structural contexts.”72 Canadian courts were not in a position to 
provide Khadr with structural remedies, such as shutting down or changing conditions 
at Guantanamo. Still, the case for the more expansive equitable remedy of repatriation is 
built on the “moral foundation” of “uncompensated injuries” by third parties—in this 
case, by the US.73 In my view, O’Reilly J. adopts this approach implicitly. He enlarges 
the harm that Canada must be asked to remedy by emphasizing the wrongness of the 
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structural regime in which Khadr was placed. Equitable justice “allows courts to order 
remedies for harms that the state may not have caused,” Roach observes.74 In Khadr’s 
case, Canada could rightly be asked to remedy a detention for which it is not solely 
responsible. The alternative of corrective justice—here, a request for exclusion of evi-
dence, which even if granted would not have guaranteed release—offers only a 
“hypocritical promise” of justice to someone who has “suffered and continue[s] to 
suffer from structural wrongs that cannot be easily or quickly rectified.”75  
Equitable justice can turn to present needs to broaden the remedial claim. Need is 
an admittedly “broad and indeterminate concept.”76 The point is to move beyond cor-
rective justice’s focus on undoing past wrongs to a fuller consideration of present needs 
which only the wrongdoer may be able to remedy. The more sensitive a court allows 
itself to be to Omar Khadr’s present needs—including his vulnerability to harm due to 
his former status as a child soldier or due to the questionable nature of American mili-
tary justice at Guantanamo—the more open it would become to the repatriation 
remedy. Corrective justice had no adequate answer for Khadr’s pressing needs.  
Second, declaratory relief is an inappropriate remedy in cases when ongoing viola-
tions pose a significant risk of irremediable harm to the wronged, and the wrongdoer 
has evidenced bad faith. Declaratory relief, as Roach notes in Constitutional Remedies, has 
the advantages of flexibility, little need for continued judicial supervision, and deference 
to other government branches.77 Yet declaratory relief was inappropriate for Khadr for 
the same reason the Supreme Court gave in Doucet-Boudreau: remedial delay was likely to 
result in irreparable harm. In Doucet-Boudreau, the French language was in a vulnerable 
and degenerating position in Nova Scotia due to a governmental failure to respect  
minority language education rights. Existing legislation formally recognized such rights 
subject to a “numbers warrant” clause. This provision left “minority language education 
rights particularly vulnerable to government delay or inaction.”78 Every year that passed 
without rights being respected diminished the likelihood that such rights would contin-
ue to exist and have relevance. “If delay is tolerated,” the majority noted, “governments 
could potentially avoid the duties imposed on them” by the Charter.79 The majority felt 
an urgency to deliver an effective remedy, which is one important reason they felt justi-
fied in fashioning an expansive remedy, institutional concerns notwithstanding.  
The facts of Khadr II and Doucet-Boudreau share pertinent similarities. Time was not 
on Khadr’s side. The more time that passed, the further his military proceedings pro-
gressed, and the more likely his legal fate would be sealed. As it happened, Khadr’s 
military proceedings terminated before Canada managed to make any effective remedial 
intervention on his behalf. Canada could be said to have managed to successfully 
“avoid” duties imposed by the Charter, and the harm to Khadr caused by his conviction 
is irremediable. The end of Khadr’s American proceedings was plainly foreseeable in 
2009 and 2010. Remedial delay is not appropriate when the prospect of irreparable 
harm is significant. In other contexts, such a situation would call for an injunction. 
However, Canadian courts could not order Americans to suspend their own legal pro-
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cess while Canada fashioned an appropriate remedy. The Supreme Court cited the rap-
idly evolving nature of the case as a reason for remedial deference.80 However, in the 
face of irreparable harm to Khadr, this was the opposite of what was required.  
Blais J. failed to grasp this crucial point in his reasoning regarding the stay of pro-
ceedings. In considering a balance of harms, he contrasted the “unequivocal” harm to 
the Crown’s discretion in foreign affairs to the uncertain harm that the Canadian evi-
dence might do to Khadr. Blais J. was faced with a situation in which possible irremedi-
irremediable harm to Khadr had to be balanced against an abstract institutional harm to 
executive discretion. In my view, Blais J. gave insufficient weight to the risk of irrepara-
ble harm to Khadr by comparing the uncertain harm done by Canada’s unconstitu-
tionally obtained evidence relative to the harm that would befall Khadr from the “total 
prosecution” by the US.81 Still, the larger problem with Blais J.’s analysis is his inappro-
priate pursuit of corrective remedies in a context of structural injustice.  
To carry the disagreement further, Blais J. arguably overvalues the harm done to 
executive discretion. In Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society, the 
Supreme Court intruded on executive discretion through a mandamus order from the 
Minister, but noted that a given constitutionally-required intrusion “does not fetter the 
Minister’s discretion with respect to future applications for exemptions, whether for 
other premises, or for Insite.”82 In other words, an intrusion to remedy an unconstitu-
tional exercise of discretion does not fetter future constitutional exercise of discretion. 
Blais J. does not recognize such an argument, preferring instead to vaguely gesture 
toward a categorical restriction on judicial intrusion into foreign affairs. This is not 
consistent with the 2010 Supreme Court decision in Khadr, which continues to recog-
nize a “narrow power” for the courts in foreign affairs, and further contemplates a 
judicial role in Khadr’s transnational remedy with its “at this point” phrase. The alterna-
tive is to adopt a “de facto political questions doctrine” with respect to remedies in 
foreign affairs and to cede the field altogether.83  
The Supreme Court’s deferential declaration was also ill-suited to a situation in 
which the executive had demonstrated bad faith by failing to take steps to ensure an 
effective remedy. Roach notes that “declaratory relief…may not be effective where 
governments do not take prompt and good faith steps to comply with the declara-
tion.”84 As it happened, the Harper government responded to the Court’s declaration 
within two weeks, but it proceeded with a minimalist remedy: a request that the Ameri-
cans exclude the evidence in American proceedings. Once this remedy proved 
ineffective, the government took no further steps.85 Earlier, a 2008 Conservative Party 
response to a Senate report made it clear that the government had no intention to make 
a repatriation request and would pay deference to the American military judicial process. 
It feared that Khadr could not be held accountable by a Canadian court, suggesting it 
was “unlikely [Khadr] will ever face conviction in Canada.”86 This, apparently, would be 
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inconsistent with the government’s “commitment to impeding global terrorism.”87 The 
Conservatives dismissed committee testimony that “Khadr could be tried and convict-
ed” in Canada on the basis that it came “from a group of well-intentioned, yet 
inexperienced, law students.”88 The document suggests a government belief that the 
repatriation of Khadr would not be “in the long-term interest of the country.”89 In sum, 
the government never had any intention of taking steps to repatriate Khadr before he 
received American sentencing. It decided it was better for Khadr to be convicted with 
unconstitutionally obtained Canadian evidence than for Khadr to return to Canada and 
potentially walk free.  
The Supreme Court deferred to a government that had no intention of pursuing 
the full range of remedial options. Specific instructions are more suited for the recalci-
trant. McLachlin J., as she then was, has expressed support for “complementary roles” 
between the legislature and courts, but this requires good faith.90 We might, as Sirois J. 
did in Marchand v Simcoe (Count) Board of Education, support more expansive remedies on 
observance of “a negative attitude” toward the rights of the litigant.91  
Even as declaratory relief goes, the Supreme Court’s remedy for Khadr is wanting. 
It fails to provide general guidance about what may be required to remedy the rights 
violation. In Mahe v Alberta, another case when declaratory relief was proffered while 
rights violations were ongoing, the trial judge said that the court should “not become 
involved with preparing or drafting methods of achieving the required objective.”92 In Khadr 
II, not only does the Supreme Court not specify a method for compliance; it does not 
specify the remedial objective either. It fails to “declare in general terms what is neces-
sary to achieve compliance with the Constitution.”93 Instead, we are left to speculate 
what corrective and equitable justice might require. By contrast, in a minority language 
case that followed Mahe, the judgment had the virtue of specifying the “essential ele-
ments” in an “appropriate scheme,” while the precise details were left to the 
government.94 In Abdelrazik v Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs), the Court established 
that which was owed to Mr. Abdelrazik “at a minimum.”95 For Khadr, the Court did 
not design a particular remedy, stipulate required elements of a remedy or articulate a 
broad remedial objective.  
Finally, a distinction between the Khadr case and other diplomatic representation 
cases merits attention. Such cases involve judicial consideration of the appropriateness 
of issuing orders to executive branches to make a representation on behalf of individu-
als detained by other governments. As O’Reilly J. notes in his trial judgment, British and 
South African cases do not establish a rule that executives must always take all steps to 
protect their residents or citizens abroad. What distinguishes Khadr from these cases, 
however, is that Canada played a contributing role in its citizen’s foreign detention and, 
in doing so, violated that citizen’s constitutional rights. Zinn J. was also alive to this 
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distinction.96 It may be appropriate for a court to grant “particular weight” to a given 
exercise of executive discretion, but the executive’s involvement in rights violations 
abroad also merits considerable weight.  
The case for repatriation still confronts opposition from separation of powers con-
cerns and notions of relative institutional competence. Principles are not rules, and as 
such do not dictate determinate judgments. In Doucet-Boudreau, the Supreme Court of 
Canada identified a non-closed list of four principles to guide remedial decision-making: 
first, a remedy should meaningfully vindicate a claimant’s rights and freedoms; second, a 
remedy should employ legitimate means within the framework of Canada’s constitu-
tional democracy; third, a remedy should invoke the “function and the powers of a 
court;” and finally, a remedy should be “fair to the party against whom the order is 
made.”97 The majority and minority judgments in that case invoked the same principles 
relating to the separation of powers, but the majority gave more weight to competing 
principles in order to justify a more sweeping remedy.  
Similarly, judgments in the Khadr quintet raise the issue of an appropriate separa-
tion of powers, but they accord the principle different weights. O’Reilly J. and Zinn J. 
would likely agree with the following proposition from Doucet-Boudreau: “[a] remedy may 
be appropriate and just notwithstanding that it might touch on the functions that are 
principally assigned to the executive.”98 Blais goes furthest in the opposite direction, 
blocking an intrusive remedy that would do “unequivocal harm” to the executive discre-
tionary power. And yet we know from The United States of America v Khadr,99 in which a 
court denied the executive the power to extradite a Canadian to the United States, that 
the executive does not have exclusive jurisdiction over all decisions relating to foreign 
affairs.  
The proponent of repatriation must also confront what may be called the emergent 
“control theory” of transnational remedies. In Khadr II, the Supreme Court distin-
guished United States v Burns,100 in which the court had demanded a diplomatic request to 
the US for assurances regarding the death penalty, from Khadr’s situation. In Burns, 
Canadian officials had the litigant in custody, but no such control existed over Khadr 
and his American jailors. This distinction becomes a pattern with United States of America 
v Khadr, where the Ontario Court of Appeal stayed the extradition of Omar’s brother 
Abdullah to the United States. The court could be confident that their order would be 
effective. This order could hardly avoid characterization as a judicial intrusion in foreign 
affairs, and it may indeed have had deleterious consequences for Canadian-American 
relations. Yet judges felt entitled to intervene and provide a robust remedy because 
Abdullah Khadr was in Canadian control.  
The control theory is coherent but unprincipled. The fact of control is not relevant 
from a moral point of view. It is, however, germane to considerations of effectiveness 
of enforcement. Canadian officials cannot ignore a judicial remedy from a Canadian 
court. The same cannot be said for Americans. Yet since judges readily admit they are 
not experts on foreign affairs, why should they be trying to make strategic judgments 
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about what will work for Omar Khadr? Rather, their job might to candidly recognize 
what could work.  
The British handling of the Rahmatullah case was exemplary. Yunus Rahmatullah 
was a Pakistani originally captured by British forces in Iraq in 2004. He was subsequent-
ly handed over to the US on conditions established in memorandums of understanding 
between the US and Britain, including requirements that the United States respect the 
Geneva conventions and international humanitarian law. The Americans subsequently 
transported Rahmatullah to an American prison in Afghanistan where he was held 
without charge or trial. In 2012, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales ordered 
British officials to produce Rahmatullah, who had been detained in US custody since 
2004, to honour the ancient writ of habeas corpus. The court did so even though Rahmat-
ullah was under American control in a prison in Afghanistan. The US refused the 
British request. The Master of the Rolls subsequently recognized the “melancholy truth” 
that the order had proved “futile.”101 But, he maintained, it was not “pointless.” It had 
the salutary benefit of forcing “the UK Government to account for its responsibility for 
the applicant’s detention, and to attempt to get him released.”102 The same cannot be 
said of Canada for Omar Khadr. The Master of the Rolls acknowledged the limits of 
British courts in a transnational context, but lauded the judicial effort to “ensure that 
the executive complies, as far as it can, with its legal duties to individuals.”103 Thus, the 
Canadian government had one card it never played for Khadr: a repatriation request.  
O’Reilly J. and Zinn J. shared the Court of Appeal’s approach in Rahmatullah. How-
ever, the equitable “Rights Maximizing” approach did not survive in more senior courts. 
In the end, after the American rejection of Canada’s request for an exclusion of evi-
dence, Omar Khadr received neither the minimalist remedy recommended by corrective 
justice nor the maximalist remedy of repatriation permitted by equitable justice.  
CONCLUSION 
A statement by the Harper government about repatriating Omar Khadr said it is 
“important that a balance be struck between individual rights and national security 
considerations.”104 Presumably, one is supposed to accept that in this case Khadr’s 
rights were rightly sacrificed in the name of national security. Jack Hooper, Canada’s 
former CSIS chief, made the point more candidly:  
I’ll tell you what our choices are. We can talk to Omar Khadr in Guantanamo 
knowing that probably the Americans would be fools if they weren’t taping 
our interview…will they use that information…in the context of a prosecu-
tion? Possibly. Does Omar Khadr possess information for an investigation 
or that allows the prevention of an act of terrorism in Canada? Possibly. So 
we have the choice, talk to Omar, don’t talk to Omar. Well, excuse me if my 
decision falls on the side of the greater good and the greater good is for the 
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majority of Canada. Omar has rights, he’s entitled to certain rights, but so are 
the thirty-three million Canadians who are vulnerable.105 
The problem with the statements by Hooper and the Harper government is fundamen-
tal: Canada has a final arbiter capable of adjudicating between rights and security, and it 
is not the executive branch. It is section 1 of the Charter of Rights, as interpreted by  
judges. The government is welcome to point to security challenges from terrorism as a 
compelling rationale to limit section 7 rights. Indeed, the majority in Re BC Motor Vehicle 
Act noted exceptional circumstances, such as “natural disasters, the outbreak of war, epi-
demics, and the like” that might justify such an action.106 The government could argue 
that a war against global terrorism required ignoring Khadr’s rights for the common 
good. In Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), we see judicial recogni-
tion of “extraordinary circumstances” that might warrant the violation of a deportee’s 
section 7 rights.107 A section 1 argument could be brought forward to justify the denial 
of Omar Khadr’s section 7 rights. Indeed, it was, and it failed.108 It failed partly because 
the Crown made a half-hearted evidentiary effort,109 but mostly because “there is gener-
ally little scope for the kind of balancing exercise required under section 1” for section 7 
rights.110 If Canada wants to defend its behaviour toward Khadr as an unpalatable but 
necessary lesser evil, it must win the argument in court.  
Perhaps there was another alternative foregone: subject to a section 24(2) Charter 
analysis about the role of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in Khadr’s conviction 
and detention, Canada could potentially have annulled Khadr’s conviction upon his 
return to Canada in September 2012. A re-trial might have been appropriate. This would 
have broken the terms of an international convention governing prisoner transfers,111 
irritated our American allies and flouted the principle of international comity, but it also 
would have terminated the connection between unconstitutionally obtained evidence 
and Khadr’s section 7 rights violation. Lest we forget: this violation continues. Khadr is 
sitting in a Canadian prison today partly because of unconstitutional evidence. The 
power to provide an effective remedy is now finally under Canadian control.  
As it stands, the longstanding failure to provide Omar Khadr with an effective 
remedy after recognizing a serious wrong besmirches the Charter. This is Canada’s  
melancholy truth. 
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